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The FDIC Should Not Allow Commercial
Firms to Acquire Industrial Banks
By Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.

Introduction
On March 17, 2020, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking, entitled “Parent Companies of Industrial
Banks and Industrial Loan Companies.”1 The FDIC’s
proposed rule (the “Proposed ILC Rule”) would
apply to FDIC-insured industrial banks and industrial
loan companies (hereinafter collectively referred to as
“ILCs”) that are controlled by “Covered Companies.”
Parent companies of ILCs would be treated as “Covered
Companies” if they are not subject to consolidated
supervision by the Federal Reserve Board (Fed). The
Proposed ILC Rule would establish terms and conditions governing applications for deposit insurance,
changes in control, and mergers involving such ILCs.2
The Proposed ILC Rule would not restrict the permissible activities of Covered Companies and their nonbank subsidiaries.
If adopted, the Proposed ILC Rule would open the
door to widespread acquisitions of ILCs by nonfinancial
firms engaged in industrial, retail, information technology, and other types of commercial activities (hereinafter collectively referred to as “commercial firms”). The
likelihood that many commercial firms would acquire
ILCs is indicated by the FDIC’s approval, on March 18,
2020, of deposit insurance applications filed by ILCs
owned by Square and Nelnet. Square and Nelnet would
not qualify for status as Fed-supervised bank holding
companies under the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHC Act) because they engage in both financial and
nonfinancial activities.3

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
Unless otherwise indicated, this article includes developments
through April 15, 2020.

Volume 39 • Number 5 • May 2020

The FDIC’s issuance of the Proposed ILC Rule
and the FDIC’s approvals of Square’s and Nelnet’s
applications represent a fundamental change in policy.
Those actions effectively reverse the FDIC’s previous
policy of barring acquisitions of ILCs by commercial
firms. The FDIC imposed an 18-month moratorium
on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms between
July 2006 and January 2008. The Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank Act) placed a three-year moratorium on such
acquisitions between July 2010 and July 2013. The
FDIC did not allow any firms engaged in nonfinancial (commercial) activities to acquire ILCs from the
imposition of its moratorium in July 2006 until the
agency approved Square’s and Nelnet’s applications in
March 2020.4
Several applications seeking deposit insurance for
commercially-owned ILCs are currently pending before
the FDIC.5 Rakuten recently announced that it was
temporarily withdrawing its application “to incorporate
feedback from the FDIC.” At the same time, Rakuten
stated that it “will continue to work constructively with
the FDIC and the State of Utah to move forward with
our applications.”6 Rakuten is a large Japanese company
involved in e-commerce, information technology, and
other commercial activities. Rakuten’s global website
says that Rakuten “has grown to encompass over 70
businesses across e-commerce, digital content, communications and fintech,” ranging from “new open platforms for e-commerce, to experiments with drones,
chatbots, deep learning and AI.” Rakuten’s website also
declares that “we challenge the status quo” and “embrace
new and disruptive ideas.”7
Rakuten has been called the “the Amazon.com of
Japan.” If the FDIC approves Rakuten’s application,
that approval would encourage many other information
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technology firms and e-commerce firms to pursue
opportunities to acquire ILCs.8
If adopted, the Proposed ILC Rule would be contrary to the public interest and unlawful for the following reasons:
(1) Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms
would (a) undermine Congress’s longstanding
policy of separating banking and commerce, (b)
threaten to inflict large losses on the federal “safety
net” for financial institutions during future systemic
crises, and (c) pose grave dangers to the stability of
our financial system and the health of our economy.
(2) Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms
would create toxic conflicts of interest and would
also pose serious threats to competition and consumer welfare.
(3) The FDIC’s limited supervisory powers over parent companies and other affiliates of ILCs are
plainly inadequate to prevent the systemic risks,
conflicts of interest, and threats to competition and
consumer welfare created by commercially-owned
ILCs.
(4) Adoption of the Proposed ILC Rule would be
contrary to the public interest factors specified in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and would also
violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The following analysis explains why adopting the
Proposed ILC Rule would be contrary to the public
interest and unlawful. Moreover, the FDIC should not
adopt the Proposed ILC Rule while our nation is preoccupied with the challenges of responding to the global
COVID-19 pandemic. The FDIC should withdraw the
Proposed ILC Rule or postpone any further action on
the Rule, until (1) the enormous problems caused by
the pandemic have been successfully resolved, and (2)
as required by the APA, the FDIC has completed the
following actions: (a) explaining the factual, legal, and
policy basis for the FDIC’s decision to change its policy
on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms, and (b)
providing public notice of that explanation and affording the public a reasonable opportunity to submit comments on the FDIC’s change in policy and the agency’s
stated reasons for making that change.The FDIC should
not approve any additional acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms until all of the foregoing actions have been
completed.
2 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

Analysis
1. Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial
firms would undermine the policy of
separating banking and commerce, threaten
to inflict large losses on the federal “safety
net” for financial institutions, and pose grave
dangers to the stability of our financial system
and the health of our economy.
a. Adopting the Proposed ILC Rule would
undermine Congress’s longstanding policy of
separating banking and commerce.
The BHC Act generally prohibits commercial firms
from acquiring or exercising control over FDIC-insured
banks, in accordance with Congress’s longstanding policy of separating banking and commerce.9 Under 12
U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)(H), which was enacted in 1987, ILCs
are exempted from the definition of “bank” for purposes of the BHC Act if they do not accept demand
(checking) deposits from for-profit business firms. ILCs
are FDIC-insured depository institutions, and they are
currently chartered and regulated by five states. Of the
25 existing ILCs (including Square and Nelnet), 16 are
chartered by Utah and four are chartered by Nevada.10
When the ILC exemption was adopted in 1987,
ILCs were small, locally-focused institutions that offered
deposit and credit services to lower- and middle-income
consumers. ILCs were first organized in the early 1900s
as small loan companies that provided credit to industrial workers. ILCs did not become generally eligible
for federal deposit insurance until 1982. The total assets
of ILCs in 1987 were only $4.2 billion, and the largest
ILC had less than $420 million of assets. In 1992, U.S.
banks and trust companies held total assets of $3.5 trillion—500 times the size of the $7 billion of total assets
held by ILCs. A 1993 report from the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) confirmed that ILCs played
only a “minor” role in the U.S. financial system.11
In July 2005,Walmart, the largest U.S. retailer, applied
to acquire (and obtain deposit insurance for) a Utah
ILC. Walmart’s application triggered widespread public opposition and led to an extensive debate about
the desirability of allowing large commercial firms to
acquire ILCs. During one of the FDIC’s public hearings
on Walmart’s application in April 2006, Senator Jake
Garn (R-UT)—the sponsor of the 1987 exemption for
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ILCs—stated that “it was never my intent, as the author
of this particular section, that any of these industrial
banks be involved in retail [commercial] operations.”12

purposes of the BHC Act. However, CEBA’s legislative
history did not include any explanation of the purpose
or anticipated scope of Senator Garn’s exemption.17

In response to the vigorous public attacks on
Walmart’s application, the FDIC imposed a six-month
moratorium on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial
firms in July 2006. In its moratorium notice, the FDIC
observed that the “evolution” of the “ILC industry” was
occurring “in ways that may not have been anticipated
at the time [Senator Garn’s exemption] was enacted in
1987.”13 In January 2007, the FDIC extended its moratorium for an additional year. In the FDIC’s moratorium extension notice, the agency pointed out that
“business plans” for ILCs owned by commercial firms
“differ substantially from the consumer lending focus of
the original industrial banks.”14

The Senate committee report on CEBA declared
that “[n]onbank banks undermine the principle of separating banking and commerce, a policy that has long
been the keystone of our banking system. . . . The separation of banking from commerce helps ensure that
banks allocate credit impartially, and without conflicts
of interest.”The Senate committee report also explained
that CEBA would close the nonbank bank loophole to
“minimize the concentration of financial and economic
resources” and enhance “the safety and soundness of our
financial system.”18 During the floor debates on CEBA,
“members of Congress emphasized that the nonbank
bank loophole must be closed in order to preserve the
general policy of separating banking and commerce and
to ensure parity of regulatory treatment for all companies that controlled FDIC-insured banks.”19

Walmart withdrew its ILC application in March
2007, due to the FDIC’s extended moratorium and the
intense public hostility toward Walmart’s application.
The magnitude of the outcry against Walmart’s proposed ILC—which included statements of opposition
from many members of Congress—supported Senator
Garn’s view that Walmart’s application went far beyond
the intended scope of the exemption he sponsored in
1987.15
Notwithstanding Walmart’s decisive defeat, the
Proposed ILC Rule states that “the industrial bank
exemption in the [BHC Act] . . . provides an avenue
for commercial firms to own or control a bank.”16
However, there is no evidence indicating that Congress
either intended or expected in 1987 that Senator Garn’s
exemption would lead to acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms.
Senator Garn’s exemption was enacted as part of the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA).
CEBA reaffirmed and strengthened Congress’s policy of
separating banking and commerce by closing the “nonbank bank loophole.” During the 1980s, many commercial firms used the nonbank bank loophole to acquire
FDIC-insured banks that either did not accept demand
(checking) deposits or did not make commercial loans.
CEBA closed that loophole by expanding the definition
of “bank” in the BHC Act to include all “banks” that
accepted FDIC-insured deposits. Senator Garn’s exemption excluded ILCs from the definition of “bank” for
Volume 39 • Number 5 • May 2020

It is highly unlikely that Congress intended that
CEBA would reaffirm and strengthen the policy of separating banking and commerce by closing the nonbank bank loophole, but would undermine and weaken
the same policy by adopting Senator Garn’s exemption
for ILCs. The implausibility of such a self-contradicting
purpose is heightened by the absence of any evidence
indicating that Congress expected that Senator Garn’s
exemption could be used to break down the barrier
between banking and commerce. In 1999—12 years
after CEBA—Congress again reinforced the policy of
separating banking and commerce by passing a statute
that prohibited further acquisitions of FDIC-insured
savings associations (thrifts) by commercial firms. In
view of Congress’s powerful expressions of support for
the policy of separating banking and commerce in both
CEBA and the 1999 statute, the unexplained text of
Senator Garn’s exemption should not be applied in a
way that undermines that policy.20
Accordingly, the FDIC’s policy toward ILCs should
remain consistent with Congress’s strongly articulated
purpose of separating banking and commerce. The
appropriate policy for the FDIC would be to allow
acquisitions of ILCs by companies engaged in financial activities but not by firms engaged in commercial
activities. As shown in Part 4 below, the appropriate
policy is also supported by the public interest factors
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report • 3

that the FDIC must consider under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act when the FDIC reviews applications
for deposit insurance, changes in control, and mergers
involving ILCs.
The FDIC followed the appropriate policy when it
did not approve Walmart’s application, imposed a moratorium on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms in
June 2006, and extended that moratorium for another
year in January 2007. The FDIC cited many of the risks
and policy concerns described in this article when it
adopted and extended its moratorium.21
The FDIC also followed the appropriate policy when
it issued its CapitalSource order in June 2008.The FDIC
permitted CapitalSource’s parent companies to engage
“only in financial activities,” and the FDIC required
those companies to divest any “non-conforming investments” within one year.22 The CapitalSource order was
the FDIC’s last approval of deposit insurance for an ILC
until it granted the Square and Nelnet applications.
In 2016, the federal banking agencies submitted
a joint report to Congress and the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC). The 2016 joint report
evaluated the risks of bank activities and affiliations, as
required by Section 620 of the Dodd–Frank Act. The
Fed recommended that Congress should prohibit ownership of ILCs by commercial firms, based on many of
the same risks and policy concerns cited by the FDIC
when it adopted and extended its moratorium. The
FDIC did not endorse the Fed’s recommendation in
the 2016 joint report, but the FDIC did not object to
the Fed’s recommendation and did not challenge the
Fed’s analysis of the risks and policy concerns created
by commercially-owned ILCs.23 As discussed in Part 4
below, the Proposed ILC Rule does not explain why
the FDIC has decided to change its policy and now
intends to permit acquisitions of ILCs by commercial
firms, despite the risks and policy concerns the FDIC
identified in 2006 and 2007.
b. Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial
firms would be likely to inflict large losses on
the federal “safety net” for financial institutions
during future systemic crises.
In view of the serious potential dangers posed by
commercially-owned ILCs, the FDIC should not allow
further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms. ILCs
4 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

have frequently failed in the past, due to problems such
as reckless lending, inadequate capital, and insufficient
liquidity. Thirteen ILCs failed between 1982 and 1984.
Two ILCs that were heavily engaged in subprime lending (Pacific Thrift and Loan and Southern Pacific Bank)
failed in 1999 and 2003. Those two failures inflicted
significant losses on the Deposit Insurance Fund. The
number of ILCs declined from 58 to 23 between the
beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 and the end of
2019, and the total assets of ILCs dropped from $177
billion to $141 billion.24
The Proposed ILC Rule greatly understates the risks
posed by ILCs and their parent companies during a
systemic crisis. The Proposed ILC Rule says that “the
FDIC’s supervisory approach with respect to industrial
banks was effective” because “[o]nly two small industrial
banks failed during the [financial] crisis” of 2007–09.25
The Proposed ILC Rule does not refer to any problems
that occurred at corporate owners of ILCs during that
crisis.
In fact, as described below, several large corporate
owners of ILCs failed or were rescued by the federal
government during the financial crisis. In some cases,
the problems that threatened the survival of those corporate owners were directly related to their ILCs. Four
very large corporate owners of ILCs—General Motors
Acceptance Corp. (GMAC), Merrill Lynch, Goldman
Sachs, and Morgan Stanley—received huge bailouts
from the federal government to prevent their failures.
A fifth major ILC owner—GE Capital—encountered very serious liquidity problems during the crisis
and received extensive financial assistance from federal
agencies. A sixth corporate ILC owner—CIT Group—
failed in 2009, thereby wiping out $2.3 billion of taxpayer-funded assistance that CIT received from the
federal government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP). A seventh corporate ILC owner—Fremont
General—collapsed in 2008, after suffering large losses
related to the subprime mortgage lending activities of
its ILC (Fremont Investment and Loan).
Thus, as the Fed correctly pointed out in the 2016
joint report to Congress and FSOC, “companies that
failed or required assistance at the outset of the 2008
financial crisis included a number of companies that
owned and controlled ILCs.” In the same report, the
FDIC acknowledged that some “parent companies or
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affiliates [of ILCs] failed or experienced severe stress”
during the financial crisis.26
In 2008, GMAC held over $200 billion of assets and
owned a large Utah ILC with $33 billion of assets and
$17 billion of deposits. GMAC was the primary source
of financing for dealers and retail customers who purchased and leased General Motors (GM) vehicles. In
2007 and 2008, GMAC suffered crippling losses from
its subprime mortgage lending business and additional
losses from its auto lending business.To prevent GMAC’s
failure, the Fed approved GMAC’s emergency conversion into a bank holding company in December 2008.
Federal agencies provided over $40 billion of financial assistance to GMAC in the form of TARP capital infusions, FDIC debt guarantees, and purchases of
commercial paper and emergency loans by the Fed.The
federal government bailed out GMAC so that it could
provide financing for vehicle sales and leases made by
GM and Chrysler after federal agencies rescued both
automakers.27
Merrill Lynch held almost $900 billion of assets
and was the third largest U.S. securities broker-dealer
in 2008. Merrill Lynch owned a Utah ILC with $60
billion of deposits as well as a federal savings association with $20 billion of deposits. Merrill Lynch suffered
huge losses from its involvement in high-risk activities, including subprime lending and securitization. To
avoid collapse, Merrill Lynch agreed to be acquired
by Bank of America—at the urging of federal regulators—during “Lehman weekend” in September 2008.
Federal agencies subsequently provided more than $300
billion of financial assistance to Bank of America and
Merrill Lynch in the form of TARP capital infusions,
asset and debt guarantees, purchases of commercial
paper, and emergency Fed loans. A significant portion of that enormous rescue package covered Merrill
Lynch’s losses. Merrill Lynch would have failed, and it is
doubtful whether Bank of America could have survived,
without the federal government’s bailout.28
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the two largest U.S. securities brokers, each held $1 trillion or
more of assets in 2008. Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley each owned a Utah ILC with over $25 billion
of assets. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley—like
Merrill Lynch—were heavily involved in high-risk,
subprime-related activities during the boom leading to
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the financial crisis. A week after Lehman Brothers failed,
the Fed approved applications by Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley for emergency conversions into bank
holding companies to ensure their survival. Federal
agencies provided financial support totaling over $300
billion to Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley through
TARP capital infusions, FDIC debt guarantees, and
purchases of commercial paper and emergency loans
by the Fed. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley almost
certainly would have failed without the federal government’s support.29
GE Capital Corporation was a subsidiary of General
Electric (GE) and engaged in a wide range of financial
activities. GE Capital held almost $700 billion of assets
in 2008, including a Utah ILC. GE Capital experienced
severe liquidity problems after Lehman Brothers failed,
including great difficulty in selling short-term commercial paper to fund its operations.The Fed responded
by purchasing $16 billion of GE Capital’s commercial
paper, and the FDIC guaranteed over $70 billion of
GE Capital’s newly-issued debt securities. GE Capital
would have faced very serious funding challenges
without the federal government’s extensive financial
assistance.30
CIT Group was a large nonbank financial firm that
provided commercial lending and leasing services to
small- and medium-sized businesses, as well as subprime
mortgages and student loans to consumers. CIT held
$80 billion of assets in 2008, including a Utah ILC. In
December 2008, the Fed approved CIT’s application for
an emergency conversion into a bank holding company
after CIT recorded large losses and experienced severe
funding problems. CIT also received a $2.3 billion capital infusion from TARP. However, CIT’s problems continued, and it filed for bankruptcy in November 2009.
CIT’s failure wiped out the federal government’s entire
TARP investment in the firm.31
Thus, the federal government provided massive bailouts to rescue GMAC, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, and GE Capital during the financial
crisis. In addition, the federal government lost its entire
taxpayer-funded investment in CIT. Those bailouts and
losses illustrate the enormous systemic risks that are
likely to arise when large nonbank corporations acquire
ILCs and combine the operations of those ILCs with
their other activities.
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Fremont General provides another example of the
potential risks created by ILCs and their parent companies. Fremont General owned Fremont Investment
and Loan, a California ILC with $13 billion of assets
in 2006. Fremont Investment and Loan was a top-ten
subprime mortgage lender, and it had one of the worst
records among subprime lenders in terms of reckless
underwriting, delinquencies, and defaults. The FDIC
ordered Fremont to stop offering subprime mortgages
in March 2007. However, that directive came too late to
save Fremont. Fremont General filed for bankruptcy in
June 2008, and the FDIC approved an emergency sale
of Fremont Investment and Loan’s branches, deposits,
and other assets to CapitalSource, a newly-organized
California ILC. That emergency sale prevented the
failure of Fremont Investment and Loan. However, the
toxic subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities issued by Fremont Investment and Loan resulted
in foreclosures for many borrowers and heavy losses for
many investors.32
Accordingly, there is no doubt that corporate owners of ILCs inflicted very significant costs on the U.S.
financial system and taxpayers during the financial crisis of 2007–09. In addition, corporate owners eagerly
exploited their ILCs’ ability to generate federally-subsidized, low-cost funding by offering FDIC-insured
deposits. For example, Merrill Lynch created “sweep”
accounts that allowed its customers to transfer cash
balances from their uninsured accounts at Merrill’s
securities broker-dealer to their FDIC-insured deposit
accounts at Merrill’s ILC. Merrill Lynch’s sweep accounts
were attractive to customers, but those accounts greatly
increased the risk of losses to the Deposit Insurance
Fund. Similarly, GMAC’s ILC used its FDIC-insured
deposits as a low-cost source of funding for loans that
financed sales and leases of GM vehicles. Other commercial owners of ILCs—including Volkswagen, Toyota,
and Target—also used their ILCs as captive financing
agencies to support sales of their products.33
Corporate owners and their ILCs have used common brand names and coordinated business strategies
to achieve a close integration of their operations. As
shown above, close connections between ILCs and
their parent companies forced federal bank regulators to deal with serious problems at large corporate
owners during the financial crisis of 2007–09. Federal
agencies rescued several of those corporate owners to
6 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

reduce the danger of contagious spillovers of risks and
losses between the financial system and the economy.
As discussed in the next section, those rescues extended
the federal “safety net” far beyond the banking system,
thereby creating very large risks for the federal government and taxpayers.
c. Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial
firms would pose grave threats to the stability
of our financial system and the health of our
economy.
Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley
were large financial conglomerates that functioned as
“shadow banks” before the financial crisis of 2007–09.
They offered federally-insured deposits, consumer loans,
and commercial loans through the ILCs and thrifts they
controlled. In addition, they provided “deposit substitutes” in the form of money market mutual funds,
short-term commercial paper, and securities repurchase
agreements (repos), all of which were payable in practice
at par on demand.They also offered a wide array of substitutes for bank loans. The activities of “shadow bank”
financial conglomerates effectively mirrored the functions of bank-centered financial holding companies,
which were authorized by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley
Act of 1999 (GLBA). GLBA marked the culmination of
a 20-year campaign in which large banks, federal regulators, and Congress undermined and ultimately repealed
the New Deal-era risk buffers that separated banks from
the capital markets.34
GLBA’s enactment produced a financial system that
was dominated by large bank-centered and “shadow
bank” financial conglomerates. The activities of those
financial conglomerates created fragile, high-risk networks that connected systemically important financial
institutions to all major segments of our financial markets. The hazardous networks produced by large financial conglomerates forced federal regulators to extend
the federal “safety net” for banks so that it encompassed
all major segments of our financial markets during the
financial crisis of 2007–09. The federal “safety net”—
including the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund, the Fed’s
emergency lending programs, and the Fed-supervised
payments system—was originally intended to be available only to federally-insured depository institutions.
However, the Fed and the Treasury Department created
a wide array of emergency programs between 2007 and
2009, which provided comprehensive protection for the
Volume 39 • Number 5 • May 2020

liabilities of banks, securities broker-dealers, insurance
companies, and other “shadow banks.”35

major segments of the financial markets to ensure the
survival of those conglomerates.38

The Fed and other leading central banks also adopted
“quantitative easing” (QE) policies to stabilize struggling economies and provide liquidity to highly stressed
financial markets. Under those QE policies, central
banks made extensive purchases of government bonds,
mortgage-backed securities, and (in some cases) corporate securities. QE policies caused the balance sheets of
the Fed, the Bank of England, the European Central
Bank, and the Bank of Japan to expand from $4 trillion
to $15 trillion between 2007 and 2018.36

As explained above, the creation of giant financial
conglomerates broke down the risk buffers established
during the New Deal and its aftermath. Those risk buffers prevented contagious spillovers of losses between
the banking system and the capital markets from World
War II through the 1980s. GLBA eliminated those buffers and allowed banks to establish full-scale affiliations
with nonbank financial firms. By taking that fateful step,
GLBA greatly increased the likelihood that serious disruptions occurring in one sector of our financial system would spread to other sectors.The systemic dangers
posed by large financial conglomerates forced regulators
to expand the federal “safety net” for banks to protect all
important segments of our financial markets during the
financial crisis of 2007–09 and again during the current
pandemic.Those vast expansions of the “safety net” have
imposed great risks and costs on the federal government and taxpayers, and they have severely undermined
the effectiveness of market discipline in our financial
system.39

QE policies provided huge infusions of liquidity
into the world’s financial markets. Repeated infusions
of central bank liquidity caused market participants to
view central banks as de facto guarantors of the stability
of financial markets. Expectations of continued central
bank support encouraged a massive expansion of credit
for governments, businesses, and households.Total global
debt levels increased from $167 trillion to $253 trillion
between 2007 and 2019, and global debt as a percentage
of global GDP rose from 275% to 322% during that
period. The enormous growth of global debt after the
financial crisis raised serious concerns about the sustainability of debt levels in both developed and developing
countries.37
The huge debt burdens assumed by governments,
businesses, and consumers left them in a highly vulnerable position when the COVID-19 pandemic suddenly
struck countries around the world. Governments and
central banks responded to the pandemic by recreating most of the emergency programs they used during
the crisis of 2007–09. In addition, governments adopted
major new stimulus programs, while central banks
launched new types of liquidity assistance programs and
aggressive new QE initiatives. The extraordinary speed
and scope of the responses by governments and central banks to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated
that global financial markets remain highly leveraged
and dangerously fragile, despite all of the post-crisis
reforms. One of the most troubling developments is that
post-crisis reforms have not changed the basic structure
of our financial system, including the unhealthy dominance of giant financial conglomerates within that system. Consequently, governments and central banks have
again been forced to provide unlimited support for all
Volume 39 • Number 5 • May 2020

The same spreading of risks and costs—and the same
impairment of market discipline—would occur on an
even larger scale if the FDIC allows further acquisitions
of ILCs by nonfinancial (commercial) firms.The federal
government’s rescues of GMAC, GE Capital, and CIT
demonstrate the hazards created by affiliations between
commercial firms and ILCs. As explained in Part 2
below, allowing more acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms would produce intense pressures for repealing
our policy of separating banking and commerce, thereby
permitting combinations between all types of banks and
all categories of commercial firms.
Widespread affiliations between banks and commercial firms would greatly increase the likelihood of
contagious spillovers of risks and losses between the
financial system and the economy. As commercial-financial conglomerates became systemically important
entities, the federal government would have powerful
incentives to spend massive sums to prevent serious disruptions from occurring in either the financial system
or the economy.40 The federal government’s extraordinary responses to the COVID-19 pandemic indicate
that our nation is already moving toward that perilous
and very costly state of affairs.
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Problems at large commercial-financial conglomerates have frequently served as catalysts for systemic
financial and economic crises in the past.The first major
U.S. banking crisis of the Great Depression was precipitated by the failures of two large commercial-financial conglomerates in late 1930. In November 1930, the
downfall of Caldwell and Company—a large financial
and industrial conglomerate headquartered in Nashville,
Tennessee—caused a regional banking panic in several
southern states. The following month, the collapse of
Bank of United States—a large banking, securities,
and real estate conglomerate in New York City—disrupted financial markets in the Middle Atlantic region
and caused a serious loss of public confidence in the
U.S. banking system. In February 1933, the failures of
Michigan’s two largest banks—which had extensive
securities and real estate operations—forced Michigan
to declare a statewide bank holiday, thereby triggering a
nationwide banking panic.41
In May 1931, the collapse of Creditanstalt—Austria’s
biggest universal bank, which held ownership stakes in
many Austrian commercial enterprises—set off a devastating financial and economic crisis that swept through
Europe.The European crisis resulted in widespread failures and bailouts at large universal banks in Germany,
Italy, and Belgium. The Great Depression’s impact was
especially severe in the U.S. and in European countries
with universal banking systems. In both the U.S. and
Europe, vulnerable networks that linked major banks,
securities markets, and commercial firms produced catastrophic spillovers of risks and losses that destroyed entire
financial systems and economies. In contrast, Canada
and Great Britain did not experience systemic financial
crises during the Great Depression. One reason for their
superior performance was that banks in both countries
were separated from securities markets and did not hold
equity stakes in commercial firms.42
During the 1990s, systemic financial and economic
crises occurred in Japan, Mexico, and South Korea. In
all three countries, leading banks were closely connected to large commercial firms through cross-shareholding networks and other joint control arrangements.
Conglomerate-style networks were known as keiretsu
in Japan and chaebol in South Korea, and they were
centered around wealthy families in Mexico. In the
1990s, all three nations experienced contagious crises that severely damaged their financial systems and
8 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report

devastated their economies. The catastrophic crises of
the 1990s in Japan, Mexico, and South Korea provide
strong warnings about the risks of allowing banks to
affiliate with commercial firms. Such affiliations greatly
increase the likelihood of contagious crises that could
wreak havoc on both the financial system and the
economy.43
2. Further acquisitions of ILCs by commercial
firms would create toxic conflicts of interest
and would also pose serious threats to
competition and consumer welfare.
Acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms produce
dangerous and destructive conflicts of interest. In 1970
and 1987, Congress amended the BHC Act to stop
commercial enterprises from acquiring FDIC-insured
banks. On both occasions, Congress determined that
the creation of commercial-financial conglomerates
would seriously impair the objectivity of bank lending
and encourage preferential and reckless credit practices.
Congress recognized that commercially-owned banks
have strong incentives to (A) make unsound loans to
their commercial affiliates, (B) deny credit to competitors of their commercial affiliates, and (C) provide risky
loans to help customers buy goods or services from their
commercial affiliates. The Senate committee report on
the 1987 legislation (CEBA) warned that allowing
commercial firms to own banks “raises the risk that the
banks’ credit decisions will be based not on economic
merit but on the business strategies of their corporate
parents.”44
Congress’s strong concerns about the biased lending practices of commercially-owned banks were
well-founded. Commercially-owned ILCs have frequently adopted lending policies that support the
business activities of their parent company and other
affiliates. The Proposed ILC Rule states that “[a] significant number of the 23 existing industrial banks
support the commercial or specialty finance operations of their parent company.”45 In 2006, FDIC
General Counsel Douglas Jones explained that two
commercially-owned ILCs—Volkswagen Bank and
Toyota Financial Savings Bank—provided loans to
finance purchases of vehicles manufactured by their
parent companies. A third commercially-owned
ILC—Target Bank—issued proprietary credit cards
to businesses to finance their purchases of goods at
Target stores.46 As discussed above, GMAC was the
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primary source of credit for dealers and consumers
who bought or leased GM vehicles.47 Square’s newly-approved ILC will make loans to merchants who
process their credit card transactions through Square’s
proprietary payments system.48
Preferential, high-risk lending and other conflicts of
interest have frequently occurred at commercial-financial conglomerates in the past. Caldwell and Company,
Bank of United States, American Continental (the
parent company of Charles Keating’s Lincoln Savings
and Loan), and commercial-financial conglomerates in
Japan, South Korea, and Mexico engaged in reckless
lending, preferential transfers of funds, and other abusive
transactions that benefited their commercial affiliates
and inflicted devastating losses on the depository institutions they controlled.49
The subsidies and other benefits that FDIC-insured
depository institutions receive from the federal “safety
net” create powerful incentives for commercial firms
to acquire ILCs. “Safety net” benefits include (1) lowcost funding from FDIC-insured deposits, (2) access to
the Fed’s emergency lending programs for depository
institutions, and (3) access to Fed-supervised payments
systems for checks, credit cards, debit cards, online and
mobile payments, and wire transfers.50
Supporters of commercially-owned ILCs argue
that the Federal Reserve Act’s restrictions on affiliate
transactions and insider lending will prevent commercial parent companies from abusing the federal “safety
net.” However, those complex and technical provisions
are very difficult to enforce in a timely and effective
manner. Troubled financial institutions have frequently
violated those restrictions in the past. For example, two
large ILCs that failed in 1999 and 2003—Pacific Thrift
and Southern Pacific Bank—violated affiliate transaction rules before they failed. In 1994, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) studied 175 bank failures
that occurred during the 1980s. The GAO determined
that 82 of the failed banks breached insider lending limits, and 49 of the failed banks violated affiliate transaction rules. American Continental and its subsidiary,
Lincoln Savings and Loan, collapsed after committing
widespread and flagrant infractions of insider lending
limits, affiliate transaction rules, and other prudential
regulations.The Lincoln Savings debacle cost the federal
government $2.7 billion.51
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During serious financial disruptions, the Fed has
repeatedly waived the quantitative limits on affiliate
transactions under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act.The Fed’s waivers have allowed big banks to provide
huge amounts of financial assistance to their troubled
nonbank affiliates. The Fed approved large-scale waivers
of Section 23A after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and
granted even more extensive waivers of Section 23A
during the financial crisis of 2007–09.The Fed’s waivers
permitted major banks to make enormous transfers of
funds to support their affiliated securities broker-dealers, sponsored mutual funds, and other nonbank affiliates.The Fed also approved waivers that allowed GMAC
to finance most of GM’s and Chrysler’s sales of vehicles
after the federal government rescued both automakers.52 As Saule Omarova pointed out, the Fed’s extraordinary waivers of Section 23A during the financial crisis
authorized “massive transfers of funds” that “purposely
exposed banks to risks associated with their affiliates’
nonbanking business and transferred [the] federal subsidy outside the [banking] system.”53
Based on past experience, it is very unlikely that federal regulators would enforce affiliate transaction rules
against large commercial owners of ILCs during future
systemic crises. As shown by GMAC’s example, regulators would probably allow commercially-owned ILCs
to make large transfers of funds to support their commercial affiliates during future financial and economic
disruptions. As a practical matter, those transfers would
extend the federal “safety net” for FDIC-insured depository institutions into many commercial sectors of our
economy.
The access of commercially-owned ILCs to the
federal “safety net” would give significant competitive
advantages to their parent companies. In addition to the
low-cost funding provided by their ILCs’ deposits, large
commercial owners would receive implicit “catastrophe insurance” in the form of expected federal support
during future systemic crises. In contrast, smaller commercial firms that could not satisfy the capital requirements and other conditions set forth in the Proposed
ILC Rule would not able to acquire ILCs and would
be placed at a serious competitive disadvantage. Thus,
allowing commercial firms to acquire ILCs would create a highly skewed playing field favoring commercial
firms that own ILCs and handicapping those that do
not.54
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The financial sector and many commercial sectors
of our economy (including the information technology
industry) already display very high levels of concentration and are dominated by a small group of giant firms.
High concentration levels enable big incumbent firms
to leverage their market power and capture unjustified
super-profits by (i) imposing unfair prices on customers and suppliers, (ii) acquiring smaller competitors or
destroying them with predatory pricing policies, and (iii)
deterring entry by new competitors.55 The Proposed
ILC Rule would allow big commercial firms to gain an
additional competitive edge by acquiring ILCs, thereby
further impairing competition and harming customers
and suppliers in many lines of commerce.
Allowing acquisitions of ILCs by “Big Tech” firms
like Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and
Microsoft would fundamentally change our financial
system and economy in ways that are likely to be very
harmful to consumers and communities. “Big Tech”
firms already enjoy significant potential advantages
over banks in the fields of automation, artificial intelligence, data management, and mobile payments. The
rapid growth of Alibaba, Ant Financial, and Tencent in
China’s financial system indicates that “Big Tech” firms
could potentially dominate major segments of our
financial industry if those firms are allowed to establish “in-house banks” and exploit their technological
advantages. Financial regulators around the world are
just beginning to grapple with a wide array of public
policy issues related to the potential entry of “Big Tech”
firms into the banking industry. Those issues include
concerns about unfair competition, abusive sharing of
customer data, violations of customer privacy rights, and
operational and systemic risks resulting from ownership
of banks by giant technology firms.56 The FDIC should
not preempt the ongoing consideration of those vitally
important issues by allowing “Big Tech” firms to acquire
ILCs.
Acquisitions of ILCs by “Big Tech” firms would produce intense pressures for removing all of the BHC Act’s
restrictions on joint ownership of banks and commercial
firms.“Big Tech” firms would not be satisfied with making “toehold” acquisitions of ILCs. They would want
to build a bigger competitive presence in the financial
industry by acquiring large banks. Conversely, big banks
would argue that Congress must create a “level playing
field” by allowing banks to acquire technology firms. As
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shown by the demise of the New Deal’s risk buffers that
separated banks from the capital markets, the creation of
“loopholes” in prudential buffers inevitably leads to the
destruction of those protections.57
Thus, allowing “Big Tech” firms to acquire ILCs
would almost certainly lead to large-scale combinations
between giant technology firms and big banks. Those
combinations would magnify the problems that already
exist due to the excessive levels of concentration, the
“too big to fail” subsidies, and the unhealthy political
influence that our technology giants and megabanks
currently command and exploit.
3.The FDIC’s limited supervisory powers over
parent companies and other affiliates of ILCs
are plainly inadequate to prevent the systemic
risks, conflicts of interest, and threats to
competition and consumer welfare created by
commercially-owned ILCs.
The FDIC’s circumscribed supervisory authority over parent companies and other affiliates of ILCs
cannot remove the grave dangers posed by commercially-owned ILCs. The Proposed ILC Rule cites only
two statutes that specifically empower the FDIC to
supervise Covered Companies that control ILCs. First,
under 12 U.S.C. 1820(b)(4), the FDIC may examine
“the affairs of any affiliate” of an ILC, including the
parent company, to the extent “necessary to disclose
fully . . . the relationship between the [ILC] and any
such affiliate; and . . . the effect of such relationship
on the [ILC].” Second, under 12 U.S.C. 1831o-1(b),
the FDIC may require a Covered Company “to serve
as a source of financial strength” for its ILC subsidiary.58 Neither of those statutes would allow the FDIC
to exercise consolidated supervision over Covered
Companies.
The Proposed ILC Rule would require Covered
Companies to enter into written agreements obligating Covered Companies and their nonbank subsidiaries to satisfy eight commitments.59 The examination
and reporting commitments set forth in proposed 12
C.F.R. 354.4(a)(1), (a)(3)(iii) & (iv), and (a)(4) appear
to fall within the FDIC’s limited supervisory authority over “affiliates” of ILCs under 12 U.S.C. 1820(b)(4).
The capital and liquidity maintenance commitment set
forth in proposed 12 C.F.R. 354(a)(7) seems to be consistent with the FDIC’s authority to require a Covered
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Company “to serve as a source of financial strength”
for its ILC subsidiary under 12 U.S.C. 1831o-1(b). The
commitment contained in proposed 12 C.F.R. 354(a)(5),
requiring annual audits for ILCs, appears to be a proper
exercise of the FDIC’s general authority to supervise
and ensure the safety and soundness of FDIC-insured
depository institutions.
In contrast, it is doubtful whether the FDIC has
authority to require Covered Companies and their
nonbank subsidiaries to agree to the other commitments contained in proposed Section 354.4. The
FDIC does not cite any specific sources of statutory
authority that would (A) allow the FDIC to examine
Covered Companies and their nonbank subsidiaries
to the extent described in proposed Section 354.4(a)
(2), or (B) require Covered Companies to provide
annual reports covering all of the matters described in
proposed Section 354.4(a)(3)(i) & (ii), or (C) require
Covered Companies to accept the corporate governance restrictions and tax allocation obligation set
forth in proposed Section 354.4(a)(6) & (8). Covered
Companies could potentially file lawsuits to challenge
the FDIC’s authority to impose those commitments on
an involuntary basis.60
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
FDIC could require Covered Companies to satisfy all of
the commitments listed in proposed Section 354.4, the
resulting regime would still fall well short of the comprehensive, consolidated supervision that the Fed exercises over bank holding companies. Under proposed
Section 354.4, the FDIC could not conduct unlimited,
full-scope examinations of Covered Companies and
their nonbank subsidiaries. The FDIC also could not
impose consolidated capital requirements or consolidated liquidity requirements on Covered Companies.
Additionally, the FDIC could not require large Covered
Companies to conduct stress tests or to prepare resolution plans pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 5365.61
In the 2016 joint report to Congress and FSOC, the
Fed emphasized the risks created by the absence of a
consolidated supervisory regime for parent companies
and affiliates of ILCs:
[T]he ILC exemption creates special supervisory risks because an ILC’s parent company and
nonbank affiliates are not subject to consolidated
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supervision. Lack of consolidated supervision is
problematic because the organization may operate
and manage its businesses on an integrated basis,
and, in the Federal Reserve’s experience, risks
that cross legal entities and that are managed on a
consolidated basis cannot be monitored properly
through supervision directed at any one, or even
several, of the legal entity subdivisions within the
overall organization. Moreover, history demonstrates that financial distress in one part of a business organization can spread, sometimes rapidly, to
other parts of the organization.62
In the same 2016 report, the FDIC acknowledged
that parent companies of ILCs “are not subject to consolidated supervision.” The FDIC also did not disagree
with the Fed’s analysis of the risks created by that lack
of consolidated supervision, although the FDIC said
that it used “prudential conditions” to “mitigate” those
risks.63 In fact, as shown above in Part 1(b), several large
corporate owners of ILCs either failed or required federal bailouts to survive during the financial crisis. Those
failures and bailouts revealed the risks and costs that
resulted from the FDIC’s inability to supervise those
corporate owners effectively.
In January 2007, when the FDIC extended its
moratorium on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial
firms, the FDIC expressed its “continuing concerns
regarding the commercial ownership of industrial
banks and the lack of a Federal Consolidated Bank
Supervisor” for commercial parent companies of
ILCs. At the same time, the FDIC proposed a set of
supervisory commitments for parent companies that
owned ILCs and “engaged only in financial activities.” The FDIC’s proposed supervisory commitments
for “financial” parent companies were similar to the
commitments set forth in proposed Section 354.4.
However, the FDIC made clear in 2007 that it was not
willing to rely on those supervisory commitments as
a satisfactory basis for regulating commercial owners
of ILCs. Instead, the FDIC extended its moratorium
to ensure that commercial firms would not acquire
ILCs.64
Even if Congress designated the FDIC (or some
other federal agency) as the consolidated supervisor of
commercially-owned ILCs, that step would not remove
the grave dangers posed by commercial-financial
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conglomerates. A consolidated federal supervisor for
commercially-owned ILCs would be hobbled by
at least four unsolvable problems. First, neither the
FDIC nor any other federal agency has the experience and resources needed to regulate large commercial firms. Any consolidated federal supervisor would
face enormous logistical challenges, including the
great difficulty and expense of hiring personnel with
expertise in many different commercial sectors of the
U.S. economy. The well-documented failures of federal financial agencies to regulate bank-centered and
“shadow bank” financial conglomerates effectively
prior to the financial crisis of 2007–09 should convince us that any federal supervisor would be even
less likely to succeed in regulating large commercial–
financial conglomerates.65
Second, designating a consolidated federal supervisor
for commercial owners of ILCs would imply that the
supervisor was a reliable monitor of the soundness and
solvency of those commercial firms. That implication
would provide a highly undesirable “seal of approval” for
commercial owners of ILCs. Consolidated supervision
would also strengthen the expectation among market
participants that the federal government would intervene to protect commercial owners of ILCs from failure
during serious financial and economic disruptions.

4. Adoption of the Proposed ILC Rule would
be contrary to the public interest factors
specified in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act and would also violate the Administrative
Procedure Act.
Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act),
the FDIC must consider several public interest factors when it reviews applications for deposit insurance,
changes in control, and mergers involving ILCs. Those
public interest factors give the FDIC broad discretion
to deny transactions that (1) present serious risks to
the Deposit Insurance Fund or the stability of the U.S.
banking system or financial system, (2) are likely to have
significant anticompetitive effects, or (3) are inconsistent
with the “convenience and needs of the community to
be served.” As the Supreme Court has explained, the
“ultimate test imposed” by such factors is the agency’s
assessment of the overall “public interest.”67

Third, designating a consolidated federal supervisor
for commercial owners of ILCs would greatly expand
the scope and intensity of federal regulation over multiple commercial sectors of our economy. The resulting
expansion of federal oversight would severely undermine the effectiveness of market pricing and market discipline within those affected sectors.

Under 12 U.S.C. 1815 and 1816, the FDIC may deny
applications by ILCs for deposit insurance after considering the “risk presented . . . to the Deposit Insurance
Fund” as well as the “convenience and needs of the
community to be served.” Under 12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7),
the FDIC may reject proposed changes in control of
ILCs after considering the “anticompetitive effects” of
such transactions, their impact on the “convenience and
needs of the community to be served,” and any “adverse
effect on the Deposit Insurance Fund.” Under 12 U.S.C.
1828(c)(5), the FDIC may disapprove proposed mergers
involving ILCs after considering the “anticompetitive
effects” of such mergers, their impact on the “convenience and needs of the community to be served,” and
any “risk to the stability of the United States banking or
financial system.”

Fourth, large commercial owners of ILCs would
almost certainly be considered “too big to fail” by regulators and market participants. Their presumed “too
big to fail” status, along with their extensive lobbying resources and political influence, would also make
them “too big to discipline adequately.” For all four
reasons, any attempt to create a system of consolidated
supervision for commercial–financial conglomerates
would be unworkable and undesirable. The impracticability and adverse effects of consolidated supervision for commercial–financial conglomerates present
additional persuasive reasons for prohibiting their
existence.66

If adopted, the Proposed ILC Rule would allow
widespread acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms.
As shown above, those acquisitions would threaten (1)
to inflict large losses on the Deposit Insurance Fund and
other components of the federal “safety net” for banks
during future crises, (2) to undermine the stability of the
U.S. banking and financial systems, (3) to injure competition by creating an unlevel playing field between
commercial firms that own ILCs and those that do not,
and (4) to harm the welfare of consumers and communities by promoting conflicts of interest, impairing
competition, endangering customer privacy, aggravating
the risks of systemic economic and financial crises, and
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increasing the likelihood of taxpayer-financed bailouts
of commercial–financial conglomerates.
For all of the above reasons, adoption of the Proposed
ILC Rule would be contrary to the public interest factors that the FDIC is required to consider under the
FDI Act. When the FDIC imposed a moratorium on
acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms in July 2006
and extended that moratorium in January 2007, the
FDIC expressed significant concerns about the potential dangers of such acquisitions, including risks to the
Deposit Insurance Fund and the U.S. financial system,
harmful conflicts of interest, adverse effects on competition, and the absence of consolidated supervision for
commercial owners of ILCs.68 The FDIC stated that it
had authority to impose the moratorium based on “the
broad statutory objectives of the FDI Act which include
maintenance of public confidence in the banking system by insuring deposits and maintaining the safety
and soundness of insured depository institutions.” The
FDIC also concluded that it should not approve acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms until it completed
an evaluation that “carefully and comprehensively”
studied the relevant risks and public policy concerns.
Without such an evaluation, the FDIC determined that
approving such acquisitions “may frustrate the substantive policies the agency is charged with promoting.” In
the 2016 joint report to Congress and FSOC, the Fed
cited many of the same risks, policy concerns, and public interest factors to support its recommendation that
Congress should prohibit ownership of ILCs by commercial firms.69
The Proposed ILC Rule does not include any discussion of the FDIC’s current evaluation of the risks
and public policy concerns that the FDIC identified
in 2006 and 2007 and the Fed reiterated in 2016. The
Proposed ILC Rule only briefly refers to those risks
and public policy concerns, and it does not provide the
FDIC’s current assessment of either the significance or
the validity of those risks and concerns. The Proposed
ILC Rule does not argue that the FDIC’s moratorium
was misguided, or that the risks and concerns motivating that moratorium are no longer relevant.70
Similarly, the Proposed ILC Rule does not provide
the FDIC’s current evaluation of the public interest factors that the FDIC must consider in connection with
transactions involving ILCs under 12 U.S.C. 1816,
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1817(j)(7), and 1828(c)(5).The Proposed ILC Rule cites
those public interest factors only briefly, and it does not
explain whether the FDIC currently agrees or disagrees
with the agency’s previous consideration of those factors
when it imposed its moratorium in 2006 and extended
that moratorium in 2007.71
In sum, the Proposed ILC Rule (1) does not provide
the factual, legal, and policy basis for the FDIC’s current decision to consider and approve acquisitions of
ILCs by commercial firms, and (2) does not describe
the FDIC’s current evaluation of the risks, public policy concerns, and statutory public interest factors that
the agency cited when it imposed an 18-month moratorium on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms
between July 2006 and January 2008 (and that the
agency presumably considered when it did not approve
any such acquisitions between January 2008 and March
2020). In addition, the Proposed ILC Rule does not
specifically invite the public to comment on the risks,
concerns, and factors that the FDIC cited in July 2006
and January 2007, or to comment on the FDIC’s current decision to change its policy and permit acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms. None of the twenty
“Questions” included in the Proposed ILC Rule refers
to the risks and concerns identified by the FDIC in
2006 and 2007, or to the reasons why the FDIC now
intends to change its policy.72
In view of the glaring omissions described
above, the Proposed ILC Rule is unlawful and
invalid under the public notice requirement of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553(b)
(3). The Proposed ILC Rule violates Section 553(b)
(3) because it does not provide adequate public notice
of (1) the FDIC’s current evaluation of the risks and
public policy concerns that the FDIC identified in
2006 and 2007 with regard to acquisitions of ILCs
by commercial firms; (2) the FDIC’s current evaluation of the public interest factors that the FDIC must
consider under the FDI Act; and (3) the factual, legal,
and policy basis for the FDIC’s decision to change its
policy on acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms.
Accordingly, the Proposed ILC Rule violates Section
553(b)(3) because it does not provide the public with
adequate notice of, and a reasonable opportunity to
submit informed comments on, the FDIC’s assessment
of crucially important issues as well as the FDIC’s reasons for changing its policy.73
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If adopted, the Proposed ILC Rule would also be
“arbitrary and capricious,” and therefore unlawful,
under a separate provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)
(A). As explained above, the Proposed ILC Rule represents a fundamental change in policy from the position
taken by the FDIC when it imposed a moratorium on
acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms in July 2006,
extended that moratorium in January 2007, and did not
approve any acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms
between January 2008 and March 2020 (as indicated
by its CapitalSource order in June 2008). As also shown
above, the Proposed ILC Rule does not provide an adequate explanation of the factual, legal, and policy basis
for the FDIC’s decision to change its policy on such
acquisitions. Indeed, the Proposed ILC Rule lacks any
discussion of the reasons why the FDIC now disagrees
with the agency’s previous assessment of the relevant
risks, public policy concerns, and statutory public interest factors. The Proposed ILC Rule is therefore “arbitrary and capricious” and invalid under the APA because
it does not provide “good reasons” for the FDIC’s decision to change its policy, including “a ‘reasoned explanation for disregarding’ the ‘facts and circumstances’ that
underlay its previous decision.”74
Consequently, adoption of the Proposed ILC Rule
would violate the APA unless the FDIC first completes
the following steps: (1) the FDIC must evaluate the
risks, public policy concerns, and statutory public interest factors that the agency considered and cited when it
imposed its moratorium in July 2006 and extended that
moratorium in January 2007; (2) the FDIC must provide “good reasons” for changing its policy with respect
to acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms, including
a “reasoned explanation” why the FDIC now disagrees
with the agency’s previous assessments of those risks,
public policy concerns, and public interest factors; and
(3) the FDIC must provide public notice of the factual,
legal, and policy basis for its change in policy, and the
FDIC must give the public a reasonable opportunity to
submit comments on the FDIC’s change in policy and
its stated reasons for making that change.
There is an additional compelling reason why the
FDIC should withdraw the Proposed ILC Rule or
indefinitely postpone further action on that Rule. Our
nation is currently preoccupied with the challenges of
responding to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The
pandemic has severely disrupted our financial system,
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economy, and society, thereby creating the equivalent of
a wartime emergency. It would be highly inappropriate
for the FDIC to adopt the Proposed ILC Rule during
the pandemic, especially in view of the Rule’s far-reaching and potentially very harmful effects on our financial
system, economy, and society.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the FDIC should
withdraw the Proposed ILC Rule or postpone any further action on the Rule, until (1) the enormous problems caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have been
successfully resolved, and (2) the FDIC has taken all
of the steps required by the Administrative Procedure
Act, as described in Part 4 above. The FDIC should not
approve any additional acquisitions of commercial firms
by ILCs until all of the foregoing actions have been
completed.
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